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“We should encourage scholars to ask new questions. Problema-
tizing the things that communities have naturalized is at least as 
important a function of science as finding the right answers." 
Alexander Wendt， Social Theory of Internαtional Politics (1999). 
INTRODUCTI0N 
In this essay， we share Alexander Wendt's aspiration in our 
own way by striving to“problematize" the deeply “naturalized" as剛
sumption of anarchy in International Relations (IR)l and subjecting 
it to a reasonably rigorous formal analysis.2 Penetrating into the 
inner postulates of this assumption and examining its logical coher-
ence and. empirical accuracy are our principal objectives. It may be 
1 Following the convention， International Relations or IR would 
denote the study or the discipline whereas the practice would 
be designated in the lower case. 
2 By formal analysis we mean， adopting Danziger's (1991: 385) 
usage of the phrase， the intellectual process of trying to speciちr
a reality that corresponds to abstract concepts and vice versa. 
15 
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useful here to make our premise clear. Although only imperfectly 
comprehensible， a knowable objective reality does exist. On the ba-
sis of this core premise we try to produce a more informed and re-
construct怠dunderstanding of the issues revolving around the ques-
tions of what international anarchy is and what it is not. In our en刷
deavor to assemble the syllables that would hopefully form tenta明
tive answers， we will make consecutive use of positivist and post-
positivist methodologies in inconclusive way. We first attempt to 
'veri今， the proposition that anarchy is the fundamental characteris-
tic feature of international politics. Then， we try to falsify it. We 
do not however subscribe to the dualist/objectivist epistemology." 
W e concede that a completely detached inquiry in social sciences is 
virtually impossible and values do indeed interfere with the process 
of observation. And yet， we should like to stress， reality as it is out 
there is knowable! 
3 For a discussion relevant to this point see， Jones (1993: 175). 
4 As W. G. Runciman (1990: 67) points out， this does not however 
mean that social science is inherently ‘ideological' in some sense 
that natural science is not. Elaborating on this point， Runci-
man writes:“Celestial mechanics was ideological in the time of 
Copernicus and Galileo; biology was ideological in the time of 
Darwin and， later， of Lysenko. They ceased to be so not just 
because the opponents certain of their findings came to change 
their politics but because the grounds of those findings were 
such that they had in the end to change their beliefs. No doubt 
those findings and therefore beliefs must， like al scientific find-
ings and beliefs， be regarded as susceptible in principle to some 
sort of possible revision. But in this there is no distinction be-
tween the science of man and of nature. It was also in this 
vein that Charles Jones commented on neorealist theory as be-
ing “much less a passive representation of an unalterable condi-
The Tsukuba University Journal of Law and Politics No.29.2000 
Our perspective at once goes along with some and rejects other 
elements of the m勾orapproaches in IR. We share differ官 ltpropo幽
sitions of the various sects of the constructivist school which John 
Ruggie has recently classified into neoclassical， postmodernist and 
naturalistic.5 The essay also endorses some elements of the argu-
ments of the idealist， realist and neoliberal schools. Like realists， 
for instance， we subscribe to the idea that states follow their self-
interest. We however cast out realism's ontological foundation that 
states exist (and interact) in a condition of anarchy.6 A1so， we do 
not accept the materialistic bias of realism.7 The essay thus adopts 
tions of the social world it treats than a means to active shap-
ing of that world." 
5 Ruggie (1998: 880-882). 
6 There is a growing literature upholding the contrary view. For 
example see， Strange (1999: 345). 
7 We disagree with the claim made by some writers that (neo) re-
alism is not strictly materialistic in this sense. David Dessler 
(1999: 132-133)， for instance， advances such a view: interna-
tional structure is defined not only by material elements， but by 
anarchy， an ordering principle that is as much a part of the 
‘shared structure of knowledge' in international politics as any 
of the norms， values or identities that constructivists emphasize 
in their explanatory accounts. Dessler also mentions that theo-
ries that emphasize the influence of material factors in social 
life (as neorealism does) necessarily presume the existence of 
social relationships and structures. Dessler's second statement 
appears to us to make sense only insofar as one does not use it， 
as Dessler does， to conclude that neorealism is therefore not 
strictly materialist. If neorealism is not materialist then what 
is? In other words， such a generalization is no more true than 
say the view that Marxian historical materialism is not strictly 
materialist theory because it recognizes the role of production 
relations in influencing social transformation along with the 
means of production. 
。
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an eccentric approach in its theoretical orientation. We do not 
know therefore what to call our own paradigmatic orientation which 
is a result of such an assortment of different perspectives and para-
digms." We shall therefore let the reader decide at the end， ifhe/ 
she so wishes， what school or approach has decisively influenced 
our analysis. Let us now look more closely at what the m弓jor
schools in IR have to say about international anarchy in the wider 
theoretical context. 
ANARCHY IN IR 
With vaηTing degrees of emphasis and shades of meaning， dif-
ferent schools of IR embrace the view that the international system 
is anarchic. Political idealism advances the idea that international 
anarchy is one of the causes of war between states." Interstate war 
is encouraged， according to idealism， by the anarchical nature of in-
ternational politics.'o At the same time idealism emphasizes the 
role ideas and institutions play in shaping individual and collective 
behavior. Po1itical realism is an IR schooI that stands at the fore咽
仕ontin defense of the assumption of anarchy in internationaI poli-
tics. In fact， some would say the very idea of international anarchy 
。???
8 According to Denzin and Lincoln (1994: 99) a paradigm is a ba-
sic set of beliefs that guide action and define the world view of 
the researcher. Perspectives， incontrast， are not as solidified， 
or as well unified， as paradigms， although a perspective may 
share many elements with a paradigm， such as a common set of 
methodological commitments. Our usage is the same as theirs. 
9 Wilson (1998: 9). 
10 Kegley (1995: 4). 
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itself originated in realist thought. Neo叫liぬbe町r叫i抱smc∞on即ce吋de白sinterna-
t“iona必1p卯01恥i託ti悶c伺酒 i詠sanarchic. It however adds that this does not rule 
out the possibility of cooperation among states.ll Social Constructiv-
ism also shares the view， perhaps regretfully， that“international 
system is not a very‘social' place".12 
Despite the apparent transmethodological consensus about the 
centrality of anarchy in IR， however， different aspects of it have oc-
casionally been challenged: including its implications ; 13 the extent 
of its role ; 14 its sources and the reason for its persistence ;日 andthe 
place of moral principles under the circumstances.16 Almost al crit-
ics seem however to concur that states interact under conditions of 
11 As Charles Lipson (1984 :-22) puts it，“[c] ooperation is， indeed， 
a企agileenterprise... [y] et rule-guided and norm-governed ar・
rangements are far more common than the usual insistence on 
an international ‘sta旬 ofnature' would suggest." 
12 Wendt (1999: 2) elaborates this view thus:“The international 
sys随mis a hard case for constructivism on both the social and 
construction accounts. On the social side， while laws and 
norms govern most domestic politics，随時interestand coercion 
seem to rule international politics. International law and insti-
tutionexist， but the ability of this superstructure to counter the 
material base of power and interest seems limited. This sug-
gests that the international system is not a very“social" place， 
and so provides intuitive support for materialism in that do-
main." 
13 Milner (1993: 143-169). 
14 Wendt (1992: 394) stated his position thus:“…sel血elpand 
power politics do not follow either logically or causally 合oman-
archy and . .if today we find ourselves in a selfhelp world， this 
is due to process， not structure. 
15 Brown (1992: 2). 
16 DeVires (1994: 2). 
?
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間町'chywith litle， ifany， empirical substantiation of its presumed 
existence.17 For al her persuasive attack on the assumption of an-
archy， inIR， Helen Milner thusJ concluded:“Anarchy is an impor-
tant condition of world politics." She added， however， that “it is not 
the only one." 18 官lerefore，no serious student of IR would be ex-
pected加 denythe p訂 amount‘significance'of anarchy in contempo-
rary IR. The widespread consensus about intemational anarchy has 
thus given討se柏 thetendency of glossing over the need to examine 
it. We should like to preface our dissent from the prevailing con幽
sensus with a brief methodological considerations. 
A NOTE ON METHODOLOGY 
Induction and deduction are the two positivist methods avail-
able to a scientist for constructing a theory.19 Put simply， in出e
case of induction， we start with specific observations and arrive at a 
generalization or set of generalizations whereas in the case of de-
duction a premise precedes a generalization. Deductive method pre・
?
???
17 官lOsewho had tried to challenge the ontological status of anar-
chy， according to Jervis (1998: 975)， seem to have been moti-
vated by the hope for a better world more than the results of 
investigation. 
18 It should be noted that Milner's (1993: 167) conclusion seeems 
to clearly contradict with (and hence does not logically follow 
from) her powerful argument in opposition to the assumption of 
anarchy in intemational relations. 
19 David Dessler (1999: 128-130) discusses this set of logic respec・
tively under the name of generalizing and particularizing 
strategies of explanation calling the latter the reconstructive 
approach， whatever that means. 
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supposes that we assume or hypothesize a premise whose validity 
has already been established， or after the due scientific process， 
would hopefully be established. Inductive method does not require 
αpriori commitment to any hypothesis or assumption. The rele-
vance of this basic scientific fact to our discussion could be stated as 
follows. 
Many of the complex set of generalizations in IR are the result 
of deductive logic based on the premise of anarchy in the intema-
tional system. It ought to be noted that deductive method does not 
help us determine if the premise is true， itmerely tells us what fol-
lows from that premise. Formulated in this way， the questions 
which arise with respect 旬 interτlationalanarchy include how we 
can empirically estabHsh， rather then merely assume， that the in-
ternational system is anarchic; whether we can legitimately as-
sume anarchy to be a feature of world politics when its validity is 
not established beyond a reasonable doubt.; and if the premise is 
not established as旬、lehow we are to accept the ar，♂lments that de・
ductively follow from such premise?却 Wecerlainly share the view 
that“consensus plays a crucial role in the process of accumulation 
of knowledge in the social sciences， especially in the face of the ab-
sence of “some extemal and町伊ablyobjective measure".21 And yet 
we propose to argue that in international relations， and more spe-
cifically in relation to the assumption of intemational anarchy， an 。
ム，、
20 On scientific method see， among others， Russel (1974: 43). 2i 
21 Jervis (1998: 973). 
。
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objectively knowable social reality does exist. 
The point of departure of this paper， therefore， isthat we chal-
lenge the validity of the premise of international anarchy rather 
than merely questioning what follows from it. For positivists and 
postpositivists， ifa thing is more or less knowable， that means it ex-
ists. For social constructivists， there are things that ‘exist' only be-
cause we believe that they do. Our own position in this regard is 
that the voluminous writings to the contrary notwithstanding， in-
ternational anarchy is neither an empirical given nor a social con-
struct or‘an institutional fact' the presence of which is not provable 
beyond a shadow of doubt. This also means we do not wish to 
equate， as some did，22 the observability of the effects of a presumed 
phenomenon with a proof that it is 'rea1' and vice versa. As much 
as predominant ideas influence behavior， the assumption of anarchy 
and the analytic and prescriptive studies based on it would however 
have major implications and consequences for the practice of inter-
national relations.2il 1f states as well as nonstate actors interact 
with the‘belief that they are in anarchic environment， we would be 
22 Eric Rigmar (1997: 273) succinctly summed up this brand of (in 
our view， flawed) argument :“There is no essential ontological 
differences between， say， a molecular structure in physics and a 
generative structure of in international politics since the effects 
of both can be observed". 
23 1n this respect we share Elizabeth Hanson's (1992: 46) observa-
tion that theories affect the world political process whether or 
not the particular theorist intends to do so and sometimes in 
ways that are not anticipated." 
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bound to witness a particular set of behavior which might not have 
been the case if the ‘beHef was otherwise. And yet the fact that the 
‘belief in the prevalence of an町chyinfluences behavior of actors 
cannot be taken in itself as a conc1usive evidence that the phenome-
The influence could in part be explained by the undis-non exists. 
putably grea加rproximity24 between the realm of scholarship and 
that of policymaking儲 aresult of the abiding concern of scholars 
in practical issues of pOliCy25 and/or because of the allure of the ma-
terial gains that∞me with becoming involved in this 'profitable 
business'.26 
lt is not the objective of this essay however to thoroughly ana-
lyze the effects of the assumption of anarchy on state behavior and， 
by 80 doing， get embroiled in the perennial epistemological issue of 
the nature of the relationship between the object and the subject of 
We are not also making the counter-claim，舗scientific inquiry. 
lnis L. Claude had done， for instance， that as orderly civil society 
has been established on a national scale， itis attainable on interna-
tional scale.27 Of course， doing 80 would be tantamount to a capitu-
? ? ?
?
???
lation to the idea that central authority is a prerequi8抗efor inter・
“ln social sCienCe8，" observed Jon Huer (1990: 68)，“the more 
one‘knows' about a subject， the more one gets involved with 
the subject. The more one gets involved with the subject， the 
more one becomes biased about the subject， unable to render 
objective aS8essment." 
R. Rothstein (1992: :討v).
E. W. Said (1994: 322). 
Mentioned in Jackson (1994: 9). 
24 
???
??
?
?
? ヮ ?
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national order. In fact， we would argue below that the assumption 
of a one-to司onecorrespondence between a central authority and or-
der， be it international or domestic， isitself fallacious. In this study 
we shall merely try to demonstrate. that the veIγassumption of an-
archy as a permanent systemic characteristic of contemporary inter-
national system is inaccurate and that the ‘anomaly' is of a suffi-
cient weight to be simply disregarded by the scientific community. 
This task is surely formidable. It is not however hard to justify the 
endeavor.却 Acareful examination of relevant IR literature would 
lead one， unless s/he is a determined maverick， towilly-nilly em-
brace the deep-rooted assumption that anarchy underlies interna-
tional politics. Anarchy in this sense is a uniちringpremise in IR， 
for al the schisms in the discipline. Perhaps it is the broadness of 
the transmethodological consensus in this regard which prompted 
one analyst to comment recently that rather than setting realism 
apart from other international theories， the assumption of anarchy 
sets International Relations apart from other disciplines.2D 
In the following pages we question the validity of the major de-
28 As Mourtizen (1997: 79) reminds us， as assumptions deal with 
something ‘out there'， itis evidently meaningful to discuss their 
degree of correspondence with this something. 
29 Guzzini as cited in Largo and Moravscik (1999: 21). In a simi-
lar fashion， Lipson (1984 : 22) went as far 副知 assertthat "The 
idea of anarchy is， ina sense， the Rosetta stone of international 
relations : a heuristic device for decoding i臼 basicgrammar and 
syntax. But what was once a blinding insight幽profoundand 
evocative-has ossified and so become blinding in the other sense 
ofthe word-limiting and obscuring." 
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rivatives and ingredients of this assumption-an assumption that， as 
indicated above， has attained the status of a universal truth. These 
include the view that the absence of a world government and the 
prevalence of international anarchy are inseparable companions and 
that domestic politics is more orderly than international politics be-
cause the former is blessed with a central government. ln parallel， 
we then advance two rival hypotheses. First we hypothesize that 
the idea of international anarchy and absence of a world govern嗣
ment as two sides of a coin does not stand to logic and empirical 
scrutiny and that domestic politic is potentially as well as actually 
more disorderly than international politics. We would then go a 
step further and argue that contemporary international politics is 
more hierarchic than it is anarchic. 
This is how we shall proceed with the task of tackling these is-
sues. In the first part we discuss what is meant (and what we 
mean) by international anarchy. Then we focus on demonstrating 
how logic and empirical evidence render the anarchy assumption 
unsustainable. We would aIso try to demonstrate that contempo-
rary interstate system is hierarchic and that an enhanced ‘intersub-
jective knowledge' of this state of world politics could provide the 
basis even for more sociaI order and cooperation among states. We 
shaIl foIlow in the most part of the essay a deductive style of rea-
soning which， as stated above， also happens to be the favorite choice 
of the predominant schooIs in lR. 
。
? ?
。
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ANARCHY: ORISMOLOGICAL AND ETYMOLOGICAL CON-
SIDERATIONS 
What constitutes“anarchy"? Elaborate answers have been 
given in different ways and for our purpose we single out only the 
following. Anarchy is a complete disorder and utter confusion.30 It 
is a condition of possibility for or‘permissive' cause of war.31 It is 
the lack of a society-wide rule-making and rule働enforcinginstitu-
tion.坦 Or，it is situation in which states have to protect and look out 
for themselves and must rely on themselves to ensure order and ob-
tain needed resources.剖 Thedefinition of anarchy as complete dis凶
order and confusion is surely too restrictive and its usage certainly 
misrepresents the notion as understood by students of IR and there-
fore we shall disregard it without any further discussion. 
We shall use“anarchy" here to refer ωwhat is denoted by the 
less restrictive variants of the definition since they are closer to the 
classical Hobbesian as well as Lockean understanding of “the state 
of nature". For Thomas Hobbes， the state of nature is a state of 
war where “men live without a comillon power...the nature of war， 
consists not in actual fighting; but in the known disposition 
thereto." "4 John Locke's cocepualization of‘the state of nature' is 
30 Strand (1999: 21). 
31 Cited in Wendt (1992: 395). 
32 Brown (1992: 17). 
33 Rosenau and Durfee (1995: 14). 
34 See， Thomas Hobbes. Leviathan. In Richard Tuck (1991: 89). 
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not also markedly different from that of Hobbes.35 As he put it，“ [tl 
hose who are united into one Body， and have a common established 
Law and Judicature to appeal to， with Authority to decide Contro-
versies between them， and punIsh Offenders， are in civil society， 
one with another: but those who have no such common Apeal， 1 
mean on earth， are stil in the state of Nature， each being， where 
there is no other， Judge for himself， and Executioner， which iS...the 
perfect state of Nature."36 It can be safely argued however that un-
less anarchy is used to denote one phenomenon in one place and a 
different phenomenon in another it had indeed been useιincluding 
by prominent IR scholars-to denote disorder and complete confu同
sion. By adopting the less restrictive definition therefore we can 
hope to make sure we engage the assumption of international anar-
chy in its most coherent and strongest shape. 
Implicitly or explicitly， virtually al of the dominant definitions 
equate anarchy with a self-help system， and/or with the absence of 
a central authority capable of making and enforcing international 
rules. In the case of international politics this central authority is， 
we are told， a world government. Although a fine， and yet， obvious 
distinction exists between the two ways of understanding the term 
and despite the different presumptive theoretical purposes behind 
35 For a detailed elaborate discussion and a slightly different in-
terpretation see， Wendt (1999: 246-308)凪
36 John Locke，“Second Treatise of Government，" in Two Treatises 
of Government. Ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni輪
versity Press， 1989)， p.88. 
0 
0 
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each， the definitions of anarchy as a self-help system and as the ab-
sence of a central authority are not mutually contradictory. In 
other words， the former descriptively answers the question as to 
what constitutes anarchy in international politics， the latter why 
this is so. Although such definitions have decisive advantage in 
some respects， they are nevertheless only of a limited utility for 
clarifying the concept. 
In a sense perhaps intended to acknowledge the imprecision of 
the concept， some scholars have made attempts to come up with dif-
ferent typologies of international anarchy. Nicholas Onuf has iden-
tified two forms. The first one， so called formal anarchy， refers to 
the type of anarchy that evolved along with ‘the quest for internal 
legal legitimacy emerging among the developing democracies 
around the turn of the nineteenth century'. Substantial anarchy， on 
the other hand， implies not just the formal absence of a head of 
state but a much more farreaching understanding:‘the absence of 
guidance provided by virtue， rights and manners'.37 Drawing on re-
cent studies， Seyom Brown has made the distinction between a 
'relatively benign anarchy' and ‘anarchy of a belligerent kind' re-
spectively corresponding to a condition of abundance in the sough-
tafter values and their scarcity.38 In the same vein， Alexander 
Wendt has argued that international anarchy follows different logic 
depending on the nature of the states that constitutes the system. 
37 See Wind (1997: 242-243). 
38 Brown (1992: 20--21). 
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Wendt has summarized his thoughts as follows: [t] he logic of anar-
chy among revisionist states takes the form of a fight to the death ; 
among status quo states， arms racing and some brawls; among col-
lectivist states， perhaps heated but ultimately nonviolent argu-
ments about burden sharing.39 Wendt， building on the works of e町・
lier analysts， correspondingly classifies the notion of anarchy as 
Hobbesian， Lockean and Kanitian anchored respectively in the 
shared ideas of enmity， rivalry. and制endship_'O 1n general， these 
typologies cerlainly proffer an additional advantage of clarity of 
meaning. But we should like to reiterate that it is the very as-
sumption of international anarchy which is misleading and inaccu-
rate however defined and typologized. We would try to substantiate 
our position in this regard after a brief review of the history of the 
concept. 
1f Hedley Bull's observation is to be relied upon， inthe Western 
world the concept of international anarchy剛understoodbasically in 
the less restrictive sense of the term-gained popularity only follow-
ing First World War after having been made famous by Goldswor-
thy L. Dicinson.41 Different views circulate however when it comes 
to an account of its origin. Some analysts trace the idea to the writ-
ings of international lawyers and theorists of the nineteenth cen-
tury.42 Others maintain that the idea is traceable to much earlier 
period of the fifteenth， sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and fur- ????
39 Wendt (1999: 106). 
40 For an elaborate discussion of each see Wendt (1999: 246・312).
41 Bull (1981: 46). 
42 One such analyst is Nicholas Onuf. See Wind (1997: 236). 
)L 
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ther elaborate what went on at the time as follows:“…when the 
universal political organization of Western Christendom was stil in 
process disintegration， and modern states in process articulation， 
the three patterns of thought purporting to describe the new inter-
national politics， and to prescribe conduct within it， first took 
place." 4:1 Still others are firmly of the opinion that it was only in 
the middle of the nineteenth century that for the first time academ-
ics “conceptualized the state in the context of an anarchic arena 
containing similarly constituted units.叫 4 We do not claim at the 
moment to adequately answer the question of the origin of the con-
cept. It may take some time， itshould be conceded， before historト
cal research adequately settles this issue. 
In any case many IR scholars， most of them realists， make reι 
erence to Hobbes as one of the inteJlectual predecessor of their 
school of thought， especially in regard to the assumption of anarchy 
in international politics. Hedley Bull for example wrote of Hobbes : 
“[al long with Machiavelli and Hegel， from both of whom he differs 
profoundly， Hobbes provides the principal impetus of what may 
loosely be called the Realist tradition， which presented world poli-
43 By ‘the three patterns of thought' Bull (1977: 23) was referring 
to the Hobbesian or realist tradition， which views international 
politics as a state of wa1' ; the Kanitian 01' universalistic t1'adト
tion; and the Grotian 01' inte1'nationalist t1'adition， which view 
international politics as taking place within international soci幽
ety 
44 Cited in Little (1999・293).
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tics as essentially the struggle for state power."40 When we exam-
ine what Hobbes himself had to say in this regard， however， itbe-
comes clear that for him relations among states were only of a mar-
ginal concerns. Yet this fact had not hampered many realists， espe-
cially those whom Rose has cal1ed “aggressive rea1ists，" 46 from using 
the analogy of the Hobbesian state of nature to exp1ain contempo司
rary world politics. In our view， rushing headlong in加 superimpos帽
ing the Hobbesian depiction of re1ations among individua1s in a hy-
pothetica1“state of nature" on re1ations among states is a fallacy 
that retards the enhancement of a better understanding of contem-
porary international affairs. A few analysts have indeed open1y 
challenged this ana10田T，more or 1ess profoundly."7 
It appears that one of the reasons why Hobbes is so appea1ing 
to many modernday rea1ists in this regard is that his phi1osophy 
mora1izes the immora1 since the notions of right and wrong， justice 
45 See Bull (1981: 719). 
46 Rose (1998: 146). 
47 Richard Little (1993: 137) is one of them :“ [tl he logic is difi晶子
ent in the two case日becausethe nature of the units in the two 
systems is different. In the state of nature， the logic of the sys-
tem is seen by Hobbes to generate a situation of absolute and 
unbearable insecurity. Each member of the system is seen to 
live in a constant fear of being killed by another member. The 
critica1 point about Hobbes's state of nature is that even 1imited 
cooperation is ru1ed out." We are of the view that Hobbes could 
be regarded as a proponent of the rea1ist schoo1 of internationa1 
po1itics on1y to the extent that the notion of the ‘security di1em-
ma' and ‘the natura1 right of states to se1f-preservation' in the 
absence of a centra1 power in the conduct of interstate po1itics 
has been very much central to the study and practice of inter-
nationa1 po1itics in the 20 th century. A1so see， Mi1ner (1993). 
7L 
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and injustice have no place where there is no central authority. It 
may be useful to note that Hobbes does not suggest the establish-
ment of a central authority (a leviathan) at the international level 
to overcome the security dilemma in the same way as he does for 
the domestic levelアl Despite the diversity of meanings and under-
standings of the term， the assumption of anarchy is rooted in the 
originally realist idea that domestic and international politics are 
separate and that their determinant variables are respectively en-
dogenous and exogenous. To say domestic and international politics 
are different from each other may be to state a fact and yet the 
analogy， or the juxtaposition， between the two realms of human af-
fairs in relation to the extent of anarchy and order in them seems 
to suffer from serious logical and empirical inadequacies.49 It is to 
these themes that we must now turn. 
THE (IL) LOGIC OF ANARCHY 
Time and again we are reminded that in contrast to domestic 
politics， international politics lacks a‘sovereign' which effectively 
regulates interstate behavior. And therefore， the argument goes， 
the latter is anarchic. As Waltz put it，“[al mong men as among 
states， anarchy， or the absence of government is associated with the 
occu汀 enceof violence.川 o True， international politics is devoid of a 
? ? ?
? ? ? ?
?
??
?
??
48 Hedley Bull (1981: 725) noted:“rhomas Hobbes says nothing 
to give sustenance to the idea that this would， or even that it 
should， happen." 
49 For an excellent critique of the domestic/international politics 
dichotomy see Milner (1993: 153・162).
50 Waltz (1979: 102). 
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single central authority resembling a national government， al・
though even this seemingly accurate statement is not as quite un-
problematic as it might first appear.51 
What should be less contentious is that the absence of a central 
authority however defined， in itself is not ipso facto empirical 
equivalent of the prevalence of anarchy. Realists and others point 
out that anarchy was institutionalized by the general acceptance of 
the norm of sovereignty.52 The statement to the effect that sover-
eignty is institutionalized is true but explains nothing for， on the 
one hand， itmerely tells us what is presumed to be an accompany-
ing characteristic of anarchy rather than its defining feature. On 
the other hand， itis hard to refute such tautological statement thus 
making it incapable of passing one of the tests for establishing 
whether or not a scientific proposition is genuinely empirical: the 
conceptual possibility for it to be false.田 Similarly，we venture to 
ask， does the prevalence of 匂nOIザ ordernecessarily presuppose the 
existence of a central government? Our answer is definitely not.54 
51 Robert Dahl (1999: 928)， for instance， has recently pointed out 
that there is a growing proliferation of an alarmingly powerful 
and undemocratic ‘international governments'， such as the 
European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund， 
which he defined as systems of decision-making by political and 
bureaucratic elite that operate with a veηhigh degree of 
autonomy， within limits set by charters， treaties or other inter-
national agreements. 
52 See Suhr (1997: 105). 
53 For a discussion of these issues in IR see Nicholson (1996: 70-
104). 
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Waltz states : 
“Nationally as well as internationally， contact generates conflict 
and at times issues in violence. The difference between na-
tional and international politics lies not in the use of force but 
in the different modes of organization for doing something 
about it..A government has no monopoly on the use of force is 
al too evident. An effective government， however， has monop-
oly on the legitimαte use of force， and legitimate here means 
that public agents are organized to prevent and counter the pri-
vate use of force. Citizens need not prepare to defend them-
selves. Public agencies do that.. A national system is not one 
of self-help. The international system is."日 (Italicsoriginal) 
Let us assume that Waltz's observation about the existence at 
the domestic level of a body that has the monopoly of the legitimate 
use of force is correct. Even so， was Waltz not on a less solid 
ground when he went on加 statethat “a national system is not one 
of self-help. The international system is，" unless what is meant by 
self-help. is different from the conventional understanding of the 
term. Our point is that international politics is at least no more 
54 
55 
MarおneWind (1997: 244) reminds us that the idea of linking 
order to the fear of punishment in strict causal terms originates 
from Galileo and classical physics， and later was reinforced by 
Newton's law of gravity， where the mechanistic prediction of 
movements was related directly to the invocation of force. 
Waltz (1979: 103-104). 
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'self-help' system than domestic politics. 1f international politics 
were truly a‘self-help' system to the extent claimed by Waltz， would 
one not expect the community of states， for example， to stand by 
and watch Iraq swallow its smaller neighbor， Kuwait. 
True， international reaction in the 1raq-Kuwait case might have 
been diluted by economic and strategic considerations. But even in 
other less clear-cut cases， states do not assume a position of passive 
on-looker if a fellow sovereign state is in a danger of ・dying'because 
of what could be regarded as unjustifiable or improper move by an-
other state. 1n addition to economic issues and vital interests， 
states do come to assist one another for moral or humanitarian rea-
sons. Consequently there is low ‘death rate' even among those irト
choate political units sometimes also refeηed to as‘quasi抱states'.1n 
the international system a number of cases could be mentioned 
where states in some sort of economic or security trouble are bailed 
out of their difficulty by other governments or non-governmental or 
inter-governmental organizations. It can perhaps be argued that in 
domestic politics， individuals are less disposed to come to the aid of 
a fellow individual merely on humanitarian and moral reasons. 
Therefore， isit not unpersuasive to conclude that “a national sys-
tem is not one of self-help; the international system is" ? 
Now， how do we substantiate our claim that world politics is 九
more orderly than it is anarchic? A step towards an answer can be 
taken first by elaborating on what exactly we mean by ‘order'. Al-
exander Wendt identifies two ways of understanding the concept. 
35 
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Politically， order refers to a situation under which people can be 
made to work towards a mutually beneficial end by reducing vio・
lence or increasing trade. This could be called the Hobbesian defi-
nition of order since this is what ‘political theorists going back to 
Hobbes have usually meant by the problem of order'.56 Sociologi-
cally， the term simply denotes the existence of a stable pattern of 
behavior， whether cooperative or conflictua1.57 Also， the distinction 
between Wendt's sociological and political definition of order corre-
sponds to A. James's definition of the same concept as substance 
and process.58 What Wendt has called the sociological definition (or 
problem， ashe put it) of order has in the same way a close affinity 
wi仕1Rosenau's understanding of the concept.回 Butin world politics 
order does not presuppose justice and/or legitomacy. And there ap-
pe町 sto be a widespread consensus in IR to this e偽 ctwith few no・
table exceptions.60 In our usage， therefore， the term order refers初
social (by and large cooperative) order which we believe prevails in 
contemporary world politics. Our concern here， inother words， is
more with empirically demonstrating that international politics is 
charact町 izedby social order rather than normatively prescribing 
56 Wendt (1999: 251). 
57 Wendt (1999: 251). 
58 See Clark (1989: 3-4). 
59 See Rosenau (1995: 50-51). 
60 In an otherwise cogent and careful analysis of the assumption 
of anarchy in IR， Milner (1993: 152) states:“Legitimacy， more 
than institutions or laws， iswhat distinguishes domestic and 
international politics. Lack of legitimacy seems in the end to 
be what many international relations scholars have in mind 
when they旬lkabout anarchy." 
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what ought to be done初 transformthis order into another (and 
presumably a better) form. 
It should be reiterated that there is no one-to-one coη'espon-
dence between justice and order. Put differently， an orderly system 
must not necessarily be a just system.61 .As far as state酪 pirations
and refusal of others to accede goes it appears that there is less of 
such a phenomena now than， say， three decades ago. Therefore， in
this sense too contemporary global politics is more orderly (and hi圃
erarchic) than it had been in earlier periods. Viewed in this way， it
may indeed be true that stateless nation would be disorderly， spe-
cially if it had one. But order does not emanate from the institution 
of state alone. As we pointed out above， itis logically hazardous to 
readily embrace the idea which equates出eabsence of world gov-
ernment with the prevalence of anarchy in the international sys闇
tem. Put simply， the absence of world government and anarchy in 
the international system are not inseparable. 
61 Rosenau (1995: 50-51) makes the mistake of conflating the two. 
He writes : What makes today's order [the second understand-
ing as discussed above} so chaotic is many of the basic pat胞rns
presently at work in global politics are marked by intense con-
tradictions and eηatic fluctuations. One looks out on the world 
scene and sees upheaval within countries and tensions between 
the:in， abject poverty in the Third World and extensive wealth 
in the First world; and whatever the geographic context， the 
scene is marked by shrill demands and counter-demands as 
various groups assert aspirations to which others refuse to ac-
cede. 
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Despite his Grotian idea of international society， Hedley Bull 
ar伊ledalong these line: [tJ he international system is stil anar-
chic， in the sense that it is marked by the absence of a central 
authority.';Z Bull seemed加 besuggesting that the notions interna-
tional anarchy and international society are not incompatible. Oth帽
ers have also pointed out that the absence of a higher authority 
meansαnαrchy' ; 6.1 or in the absence of a central government， politi-
caI organizations take an anarchic form.61 In a book misleadingly 
entitled， The Hierαrchy of St，αtes， Ian Clark has pointed out:“…al圃
though the dichotomy between anarchy and hierarchy can be under-
stood， the de臼criptionof the state system as hierarchical in this 
book is not intended to deny its ‘selιhelp' anarchical characteris-
tics; hierarchy， thus viewed， collectivizes decision-making within 
the rank of Great Powers while retaining the anarchical form of 
politics as between that rank and the other日"師 ()urtrouble is not 
only with the fact that the absence of a central authority is equated 
with anarchy in most IR scholarship. What is also troubling to us 
is the fact that this is taken to be a constant feature of world poli剛
tics. For many of the scholars following this tradition of analy日is，it 
62 Hedley Bull (1981: 736) also did in fact write about a society of 
states (or international society) which he defined as a group of 
states which， conscious of certain common interests and com崎
mon values， form a society in the sense that they conceive 
themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their rela骨
八 七ionswith one another， and share in the working of common in・
;L stitutions. 
38 63 Rosenau and Durfee (1995: 14). 
64 Little (1993: 139). 
65 Clark (1989: 2-3). 
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is di伍cultto see that the underlying principles of intemational 
politics are different企omthose which Hobbes sets forth.66 
We might then ask， in what way should we view the aπay of 
bilateral and multilateral agreements that states enter into. A real-
ist would readily respond that in making such agreements， states 
explicitly confirm each other's sovereignty and therefore actively 
help to reproduce the deep structure of the intemational sys加m.
Treaties and acts of cooperation al intentionally serve to reconfirm 
and reproduce the anarchic system of independent states.町 The
problem with such circular ar.♂lment is that at the end of the argu-
ment we know no more than at the beginning. In addition， and 
perhaps even more crucially， the view which attributes the ‘preva-
lence' of the structure of ‘intemational anarchy' to也efact that each 
state comprising the international system enjoy sovereignty is 
hardly sustainable. As indicaled earlier， that contemporary states 
are sovereign and that they recognize each other is a fact that is not 
contentious at al. But this phenomenon ipso facto engenders inter-
national anarchy is far less convincing. In other words， even if it 
were true that states began to expect more violence and conflict in 
their interaction when sovereignty was institutionalized， this mere 
fact cannot justifiably be used as a proof of one causing the other 
even though such post hoc 問 asoningmay help to fil the explanか
toηvacuum. In fact the very same point could logically lead to the 
66 Bull (1981: 737). 
67 For a discussion along this line， see Little (1993: 152). 
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opposite conclusion. In such instances the situation seems to be 
bearing out Wendt's observation that states that recognize each 
other's sovereignty tend not to conquer each other， not because they 
cannot， but because recognition implies a willingness to live and let 
live.66 Therefore， itis safe to conclude that the explanation of anar-
chy in terms of sovereignty is illogical to its very roots. 
Put in another way， rather than confirming the prevalence of 
anarchy in the international system， inter-state agreements， incluι 
ing on the principle of sovereignty， signiちrthe existence of ‘the ele-
ment of international society'. Thus， itcan be argued that theoreti-
cally as well as in practice the absence of a central authority results 
in anarchy only when there is a widespread disagreement as to the 
basis of order or hierarchy in the system of states and that the 
‘inter幽subjectiveknowledge' of the place of self and other ♂mrantees 
stability and hierarchy in the system. This notion somewhat corre刷
sponds to the social constructivist concept of ‘social structures' the 
partial definition of which is a shared understandings， expectations， 
or knowledge，6D none of which is perfect or complete; but neither is 
it wholly unreliable or irrelevant.7o 
EMPIRICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Hierarchy rather than anarchy characterizes contemporary in-
八 ternationalpolitics. By hierarchy， we simply mean“a social aト
ヨ七
40 68 Wendt (1999: 209). 
69 The other elements of social structures are material resources 
and practices. Wendt (1995: 73). 
70 Wendt (1999: 108) further elaborates the notion in his most re-
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rangement characterized by stratification."71 It is not of course true 
that there is one， universally agreed upon， system of hie1'archy of 
states. Different sets of hie1'a1'chies of states have existed in diffe1'-
ent issue a1'eas and at different times. On this point， we concur 
with Joseph S. Nye that “no single hie1'archy desc1'ibes adequately 
contemporary world politics."n As indicated above， ana1'chy does 
not mean chaos; neither does it mean， by any st1'etch of the imagi-
nation， o1'de1' or hiera1'chy. The two catego1'ies 1'ep1'esent ideal types 
and， for al intents and purposes， they are opposite although it is 
open to debate， depending on how one defines the concepts， exact1y 
what type of opposition this represents. Our own position in this 
1'egard can be best illustrated by visualizing a diagram. Let us sup幽
pose we have on the negative side of the x験axisana1'chy (defined 
here， and only he1'e as complete chaos) on the other side there is hi-
era1'chy (similarly defined as elabo1'ate 1'ank and order in a stable 
system). Regardless of the definitional variations such as that 
exists in the academic discourse， subsequent to a careful empirical 
observation it ought to become evidently clear that contempo1'ary 
cent book in this way:“contemporary states have been inter明
acting fo1' dozens， even hund1'eds of years， during which they 
have accumulated considerable knowledge about each other's 
interests. They know something about each other's grievances 
and ambitions， and thus about whether they a1'e status quo or 
1'evisionist states. They know something about each other's 
styles of dispute resolution. And they even know something 
about the condition under which these conditions might 
change." 
71 The definition is adapted f1'om Clark (1989: 2). 
72 Nye (1992: 88). 
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international system is much more closer to hierarchy and is far-
ther from anarchy than the other way round. 
One source of hierarchy which is based on the inter-subjective 
understanding among states in different spheres of international af二
fairs could be what international relations scholars cal regimes the 
main function of which is“the creation of a pattern within sets of 
issue areas whichα'Pproximαte legα1 liability whereby states con-
form to agreed rules due to converging expectations and due to the 
enhancement of coordinated sanctions against defectors."'3 (ItaHcs 
added) Racial， geographic， economic and cultural indicators as well 
as the so called national characters had also been in use for bestow-
ing on or withholding 仕oma state a status in the international hi-
erarchy.'4 One set of such indicator， namely the quality of health， 
education and welfare， according to Henry Barbera's taxonomy，∞n-
stitutes， 'the development hierarchy of nations'.7月 Thereare also 
less explicit sources of hierarchization in the international state sys-
tem. What we should like to emphasize here is that there are rela骨
tively durable-as opposed to fragile and fleeting-hierarchies virtu-
73 Attributed to Robert Keohane， see Suhr (1998: 98). 
74 For an excellent discussion of the analytic interpretation based 
on these variables see O'Niel (1982). Clark (1989: 23) also 
broadly identifies a few types of hierarchy in the international 
system:“…hierarchy is commonly assigned in terms of politico-
strategic power， yielding the traditional groupings of Great 
Powers， medium powers， and small powers. It may equally be 
described in economic terms， yielding the stratification into 
first， second， third and fourth worlds. Outside a statist per-
spective， itmay be analyzed in terms of centers or ωres， semi-
peripheries and peripheries. Its key theme is that disparities 
in capability are reflected， more or less formally， inthe decision 
‘making of the society of states." 
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ally in al areas of potential conflict and cooperation among states. 
These hierarchies are established through 'voluntary agreement' or 
through ‘tests of will and strength' among rivals. Sometimes， the 
place a state occupies could simply be bestowed upon it and the 
status thus attained or assigned could be more or less attuned to 
what that particular state would wish it to be.7'; Alexander Wendt 
attributes the widespread compliance， or respect for international 
hierarchy， respectively to coercion， self司interestand legitimacy.77 
It appears that human beings naturally tend 旬 rankand order 
events， peoples， states and other collectivities however more or less 
elaborate or systematic the process may be.78 The point is human 
beings tend to perceive groups of individuals or collectivities in a 
context of hierarchy-imagined or real“and thus it makes sense if we 
regard ourselves as Homo Hierarchicus.79 And intended or not， this 
human predisposition contributes to stability in the interaction and 
75 Barbera (1973: 1). 
76 Russia's recent admission to the G 7 may be considered as an 
instnace of a bestowal of a higher status on a state in the hier-
archy of nations. In fact， Russia is neither a full-fledged liberal 
democracyt nor a‘wealthy' industrial nation to qualiy objec-
tively to join the club. On the other hand， the denial to the 
newly-formed state of Somaliland an international recognition 
despite the fact that the government there enjoys internal le網
gitimacy and that the territory is more orderly and viable t出han1 
many other min凶E討1.匂.叫a凶te剖smay be an i加n自坑tnace0ぱfthe wi託thheld也ing
Oぱffrom a political unit the 自凶ta叫tu凶s0ぱfsovereign 白t阻at胎eho∞odwhich 
iおsthe min凶1註imumrequirement t加oJ炉oi加nthe hierarchical interstate 
system. 
77 Wendt (1999: 286). 
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order in the system. 
“[T) he distribution of power in world politics，" Joseph Nye ob-
served not so long ago，“has become like a layer cake. The top mili鴫
tary layer is largely unipolar...The economic middle layer is tripo-
lar...The bottom layer of transnational interdependence shows a diι 
fusion of power."制 Morerecently， David Held and Anthony 
McGrew have similarly this to write on today's world military or・
der:“[i) t isstratified in that there is broadly a first tier (with su-
perpower status)， second tier (middle-ranking powers)， and third 
tier (developing military powers); and it is institutionalized in that 
military-diplomatic and multilateral arrangements define regular-
i也ze吋dp伊at此te訂rn附s0ぱfi加nt胞era涜c倒tion
could s“ti江出llb悦etrue t出ha剖tworld politics is anarchic. In our view， such 
statements about the intemational distribution of power can only be 
read as a systematic account of the dynamics of hierarchy in diffel・-
ent spheres of world politics. Following the trail blazed by other 
prominent IR scholars，B2 however， neither Nye nor Held and 
McGrew openly endorse the idea of the hierarchy of states. 
78 This may be due to the quest for what Wendt (1999: 131) has 
called ‘ontological security' defined as the human predisposition 
for a“relatively stable expectations about the world around 
them. Along the need for physical secUJ吐ty，this pushes human 
beings in a conservative homeostatic direction， and to seek out 
recognition of their standing from society." 
79 For a detailed discussion of the concept， see Dumont's (1980) 
book of the same title. 
80 Nye (1992: 88) 
81 Held and McGrew (1998: 222). 
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Power is one of the central concepts in international politics 
and has been analyzed in a variety of ways. The moment we start 
talking about distribution of power in the international system， be 
it structural or relative， soft or hard， the key issue becomes， ac-
knowledged or not， the dynamics of hierarchy of states and not its 
counterpart. Embedded even in the very notions of multipolarity， 
bipolarity， unipolarity as well as the balance of power principle is 
the idea of hierarchy. By the same token， when we talk about dゃ
veloped countries versus developing countries or the core versus pe-
riphery， the point of reference is a well-established hierarchy of 
states. In general， a careful reading of even realist texts revea1 that 
the major themes of their analyses revolve around the questions of 
what type of hierarchies exist， which ones have what effects and 
why and how they change. 
To be sure there are， and will always be， instances where hie子
archy is contested， and sometimes forcefully， for it is 'shared-
know1edge' rather than an‘external body' that effectively restrains 
interstate behavior. Iraqi invasion of Kuwait is a clear example. 
But such aberrations are rather 1imited， much 1ess limited than 
transgression of ru1es and norms within states.悶 In1998 out of the 
twenty seven major armed conf1icts in the world al but two213 
ethose between India and Pakistan and between Eritrea and 
Ethiopia-were domestic."' In fact， there has been a steady decline 八
82 One is 1eft with similar impression after reading such classic 45 
texts as Paul Kennedy (1987); and Robert Gilpin (1981) etc. 
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in the number of interstate wars in the international system since 
1648，85 whereas the percentage of countries with ethnic wars has 
been on a more or less steady increase since 1955.曲 Inshort， inter-
state politics is characterized by a relative peace more than intra-
state politics. Most states follow most international law most of the 
time.87 
On Waltz's Theory of Internαtionα1 Politics， some writers have 
remarked， and correctly so， that despite its scientific claims most of 
its propositions are self-contradictory and not falsifiable. His state晴
ment on anarchy seems to clearly elucidate this inadequacy. For 
him to Waltz， the existence of more violence or expectation of vio-
lence at domestic level could not be taken as an indicator of its be-
83 In fact， some analysts， such as M. Ayoob (1991: 88-89) have ar・
gued“conflict in the Third World during the postWar decades 
was actively encouraged by superpower policies largely aimed 
at testing one another's political will and power projectioncapa-
bilities in areas of the globe peripheral to the vital concerns of 
the superpowers themselvesプ
84 See SIPRI (1999: 7). It should be noted that the short-lived 
conflict between India and Pakistan is in essence the spill over 
of a long噸standingdomestic conflict rather than a fullfledged inω 
terstate conflict. In the case of Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict too nei-
ther side openly challenged the 泡overeignty'of the other. The 
problem instead pertained to the different interpretation of the 
physical confines of the sovereignty. 
85 See Holsti (1991) and (1996). 
86 GUIT et al. (1999: 53). 
87 Wendt (1995: 76)， For an elaborate statement of a similar idea 
see Bull (1977: 42). 
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ing more anarchic than international politics because of the exis-
tence in the former of a body with the monopoly of the legitimate 
use of force.88 Such statement unmistakably contradicts one of the 
pillars of his theoIγthat“[a] mong men， as among states， anarchy， 
or the absence of government， isassociated with the occurrence of 
violence.川 9 This is simply because if we pursue this line of argu-
ment， the logical conclusion would be that that he larger the num-
ber of OCCUπences of violence， the more anarchic the system is. 
Waltz states his position in these terms : 
Since world politics， although not formally organized， isnot en-
tirely without institutions and orderly procedures， students are 
inclined to see a lessening of anarchy when alliances form， 
when transactions across borders increase， and when interna-
tional organizations multiply. Such view confuses structure 
with process.90 
It appears therefore that for Waltz an increase as well as a de・
crease in interstate violence， or an increase or a decrease in the ex尉
pectation of it， and an increase in the level and magnitude of coop-
eration among states do not undermine the validity of the assump幽
tion of international anarchy. In his eagerness to give coherence to 
88 "To discover qualitative differences between internal and exter・
nal a伯 irsone must Iook for a criterion other than the occur-
rence of violence. The distinction between international and 
national realms of politics is not found in the use or the non-
use offorce but in their different structures." Waltz (1979: 103). 
89 Waltz (1979: 102). 
90 Waltz (1979: 14). 
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his theory， Waltz's statement lays bare the Achilles Heel of 
neorealism-its insistence that the structure of international anarchy 
is permanent， and an unalterable. A devoted neorealist may accept 
Waltz's views in this regard as a mat胞rof faith， but we are not one 
of them. We are told that if we try to clearly distinguish between 
structure and process， we would be able to see the truism ofWaltz's 
position on this score. But why is it that significant changes in a 
process (such as the decrease in the occu町'enceof violence among 
states) do not a能 ctthe structure (of international anarchy) within 
which they take place. Our own position in this regard is that sig-
nificant changes in social processes engender changes over time in 
the structure while at the same time also reflecting these same 
changes. Otherwise， one will be confronted with the type of choice 
Jean Piaget once talked about， the choice between structureless 
genesis on the one hand創ldungenerated wholes or forms on the 
other.91 
For Waltz， what makes domestic politics inherently different 
仕om(and less anarchic than) its international counterpart is the 
existence in the former， at least as far as e佐ctivegovernments are 
concerned， of a body which has a‘monopoly on the legitimαte use of 
force'. Such statements could also be challenged first in light of the 
fact that the very concept of legitimacy has undergone change even 
in places where there were effective governments. Perhaps this is 
at凶butableto what some have called the ‘relocation of authoriti."2 
91 Piaget (1973: 9). 
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It is becoming increasingly clear that even an effective， elected gov-
ernment cannot take for granted that it can effectively employ its 
monopoly on the legitimate use of force whenever it so desires. 1n 
other words， there are growing challenges to a government's monop-
oly on the use of legitimate force from competing groups whose posi-
tion is gradually being recognized. Waltz has argued that he might 
feel unsafe walking along the street. Is that different from saying 
that domestic politics despite the government's monopoly on the use 
of legitimate force， isat least as anarchic as international politics in 
the sense of increased expectation of violence? Of course， we know 
by now that when confronted with such a challenge， Waltz would 
refer us to the all-purpose conceptual dichotomy of structure and 
process. 
Notwithstanding Waltzian theory， itis our view that domestic 
politics is markedly closer to potential anarchy than international 
politics. Even ardent critiques of some of the major propositions of 
political realism are inclined to reject such an ar♂lment out of 
hand. DeVries， for instance， points out that it is undeniable that 
there is a lack of a meaningful central authority and hence the 
greater expectation of violence in interstate relations than in the 
domestic affairs of many states.削 We，however， argue that in do・
mestic politics there is an alarming lack of‘shared knowledge' as to 
one's place and this is a potential (as well as actual) source of anar-
chy. All‘citizensにregaI世間sof their economic， ethnic， religious or 
?????
92 Rosenau and Durfee (1995: 37-40). 
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political standing-seriously regard themselves as equals while un-
fortunately the sad fact is that they are not. For instance， some are 
richer than others or more educated than others. These distinctions 
also carry with them a broad ranging consequences both for the so-
cial status and privileges of the individuals as well as for conflict 
and anarchy. To say that such inequality of ‘citizens' in the face of 
a legally ‘guaranteed' equality is crucial， however， isonly to state 
the obvious， even if the obvious is often ignored. In international 
politics， despite the principle of ‘sovereign equality' of states in-
grained in the Charter of the United Nations糊nostate seriously con-
siders itself as equal to others. Each state is fully aware that the 
principle of sovereign equality does not work outside the General 
Assembly Hall of the UN. The potentials for domestic anarchy on 
the other hand is also heightened in a different way. As Wendt 
elaborates， 
it may actually be easier 加 assessthe intentions and therefore 
predict the behavior of states than it is of individuals. Political 
Realists have often extrapolated fI'om the difficulties of reading 
the human mind to a supposed difficulty in knowing the inten-
tions of states， and on that basis justified worst case assump“ 
tions about the threat posed by those intentions...the structure 
of corporate“minds" is typically written down in organizational 
93 8ee DeVries (1994: 237). Note that for Waltz even less expecta-
tion of violence in international po1itics does not refute his gen-
eralization that interstate politics is more anarchic domestic 
politics. 
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charts that specify the functions and goals of their constituent 
elements， and their “thoughts" can often be heard or seen in 
the public debates and statements of d白ecis討ionト.冒叩E
Not only is there greater potentials for anarchy in domestic 
politics， there is some instructive empirical evidence indicating that 
it has already become so. Waltz writes，“ [i] n any self二helpsystem， 
units woη'Y about their survival， and the worry conditions their be-
havior.哨 ltmay indeed be an extreme case， but according to a Te-
cent nation引ridepoll seventy percent of Colombians said that they 
are afraid of going out at night because they feel insecure. "(; One 
wonders if there is a single state， weak or strong， that worries in 
these terms for its survival. lu addition， today individuals are re四
leutlessly confronted with social， political and ecouomic complexities 
that impel them to forgo their rudimen加rypremises and replace 
them with more elaborate conceptions of how to respoud to the chal-
leuges of daily life.川 Duealso to what has come to be known as the 
“third wave of democratization" the world has witnessed throughout 
the last decade of the 20th century the birth of democracies and 
partial democracies iu different corners of the globe.98 There were 
86‘democratic' countries iu 1997 as compared with only 8 in 1900， 
with more thau half of the world's population living today under 
‘democratic' governments.的 lntriguinglyenough， though， democrati-
94 Wendt (1999: 222). 
95 Waltz (1979: 105). 
96 SαnFr，αncisco Chronicle， February 10， 2000. 
97 Rosenau and Durfee (1995: 36). 
?
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zation of political systems appears to engender more anarchy dか
mestically while at the same time enhancing order in the realm of 
inter-state relations.'(同
Even before the onset of the “third wave of democratization"， 
domestic politics seemed to have been characterized， both poten-
tially and actually， by anarchy more than international politics. 
This statement can be substantiated by taking a state with a citi-
zenry known to be most lawabiding than any other自tate.Then cal-
culate the rate or percentage of transgression of laws by its citizens 
and compare it with the rate of transgression of law by states in the 
‘international society'. It is reasonable to surmIse that such figure 
would support the argument that the presence of a central， coercive 
authority is no guarantee for the prevalence of order and that the 
98 For a concise summa1'y of the reasons behind this‘wave'， see 
Dahl (1999: 920-924). 
99 Dahl (1999 : 921'-923). 
10 Our conjecture is consistent with the result of a recent study 
(Gur・ret al. 1999: 52-55) which found out that autocracies are 
much less vulnerable to state failul'e than are partial democra噸
cies. In the Sub-Saharan Africa， for instance， the study con-
cluded， other things being equal， partial democracies were on 
average 11 times mOl'e likely to fail than autocracies. The 
study defines partial democracy as a country which has some 
democratic characteristic判suchas elections-but also have some 
autocratic characteristics， such as a chief executive with almost 
no constrail1ts on his/hel' powe1'， sha1'p limits on political com綱
petition， a state restrained press， or a cowed 01' dependent judi-
ciary. And on the basis of this definition， study identifies more 
than twenty such countries. 
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absence of an international central authority or world government 
does not in itself foster anarchy. 1n addition， whereas it is true that 
history has not yet ended as Francis Fukuyama had claimed，101 
there are， as stated above， more states in contemporaηinterna-
tional system which are democratic compared to any other period in 
human history.山 Thisis if anything is likely to enhance the trend 
towards anarchy at the domestic level and hierarchy at the interna-
tional level. 
To be sure， the claim that democratic states are potentially 
more anarchic than undemocratic states must however be tempered 
by the important consideration that democracy seems to be by far 
the best type of political system， at Ieast as far as domestic govern-
ance goes. On the other hand， itshould be reiterated that more 
states are democratic now than in any other period in human his-
tory carries with it a significant implication for interaction among 
states and the concocted idea of international anarchy. It might 
well have been observations such as these which led Wendt to con嶋
clude: 
..very few states today are comple旬 blackboxes to each other， 
not least because states are internally related to societies over 
which they rarely have complete control. The actors and proc-
101 Fukuyama (1992). 
102 For why this is so and the future promises to be more of the 
same， see Dahl (1999). 
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esses of civil society provide considerable information to other 
states on their own state's intentions and capabilities， and the 
spread of democracy will only increase this openness in the fu岨
ture. More and more， inother words， s“ta叫te悶swill be able t旬o1批i抗t-
erally look inside each other乍“headsぜ"in a way that individuals 
never Will.103 
CONCLUSION 
We have sought to demonstrate in this essay that the ossified 
concept of anarchy in international relations is a theoretical con司
struct which is far removed 合omempirical reality. While it is true 
103 Wendt (1999: 222-223). Contrary to what appears to be the 
case at first glance， we are not however endorsing the truism of 
the ‘democratic peace theory' which is accorded by many the 
virtual status of empirical law in contemporary international 
relations theory. 1n fact， we are of the opinion that the ‘theory' 
which clearly has a heavy dose of rationalist assumption needs 
further examination. The underlying assumptions of this 'theo-
ry' are that democracy introduces a selection bias in favor of pa-
cific leaders and that Republican constitutionalism restrain 
leaders from making wars at will. Therefore democracies tend 
not to fight each other. For its obviously desirable normative 
consequences， upholding such a view as a socializing principle 
is fine. But as an objective theo1'etical explanation of interna-
tional politics， itappears to be flawed. Democ1'acy is not an in暢
ternational value (or a systemic cha1'acte1'istic of international 
politics)， the fact instead is that democ1'acy is me1'ely a struc-
tural p1'ocess by which a system of governance is o1'ganized do-
mestically. It is also about how national decisions a1'e made. 
But democ1'acy does not prescribe the type of decision that 
ought to (or would be) made in democratic countries. The1'e-
fo1'e， itis theoretically possible fo1' people to democ1'atically elect 
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that a degree of abstraction is an unavoidable， and may even be de-
sirable in a scientific project， for a theory to yield fruit its concepts 
should be able to approximate reality as much as possible. The con-
cept of anarchy fails to do so. To the central question whether 
world politics is conducted in an elaborate set of hierarchy at every 
level and issue area， the answer we gave is definitely not. The im醐
age of world politics as an uncontrollable anarchy is also absurd. 
In the preceding pages we have also called into question both 
the logic and the empirical validity of the assumption of anarchy in 
international relations and its principal derivatives and ingredi-
ents; namely， that there is a one-to.・onecorrespondence between 
the absence of a‘world government' and the ‘reign of anarchy'; that 
world politics is more anarchic than domestic politics; and that du-
rable and genuine cooperation among sovereign states becomes ex-
leaders that would engineer catastrophic international wars. It 
can be argued logically， as Onuf and Johnson did， that democ-
racy“can make war easier by making government more efi-
cient and legitimating access加 societalresources." In short， 
there is no logic in democracy that prevents two 01' more demo“ 
cratical1y elected governments from going to war against each 
other if the conflict in their 'national interest' proves so diver-
gent as to make a compromise impossible. If there has been a 
long peace among democracies during the last several decades， 
it may be more due to the impact of the ‘belief in democratic 
peace than the truism of the theorγitself. 
Logic does not support that democracies do not fight each 
other especially when and if their vital interests irreconcilably 
diverge. The paraphrases on the assumptions of democratic 
peace and citations are from Onuf and Johnson (1995: 179-
191). 
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tremely difficult， ifnot impossible， under the circumstances. 
Our tentative conclusions are that contemporary world politics 
is more hierarchic than domestic politics and that there are factors 
such as intersubjective knowledge and shared understandings 
which in the absence of world government provide the basis for or-
der and stability in the international sys旬m.Since the assumption 
of anarchy in international relations raises such wider questions 
which have yet to be adequately analyzed， itis our hope that other 
researchers would attempt to approach them from a variety of ways. 
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